Spillover Effects of Regulatory Inspections: Evidence from OSHA -- by Matthew S. Johnson, David Levine, Michael W. Toffel

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  • Acknowledgements and Disclosures

    We are grateful for guidance from Dave Schmidt, Amee Bhatt, and Ricky Gonzalez on institutional details about the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and for excellent research assistance by Melissa Ouellet and empirical guidance by Xiang Ao. We benefited from comments by participants in presentation at UC Berkeley and the Department of Labor. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Department of Labor’s DOL Scholars Program. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.


  • Citation and Citation DataCopy Citation Matthew S. Johnson, David Levine, and Michael W. Toffel, "Spillover Effects of Regulatory Inspections: Evidence from OSHA," NBER Working Paper 35646 (2026), https://doi.org/10.3386/w35646. Copy to Clipboard Download Citation
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